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ABSTRACT

Renewable Portfolio Standards and Environmental Goals
by
Josh T. Smith, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2018

Major Professor: Dr. William F. Shughart II
Department: Economics and Finance
Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are one of the most common state-level
policies meant to encourage low-carbon energy development. RPS require that utilities
purchase electricity from certain qualifying electricity generators, usually with no
reference to the cost of that electricity. Though RPS are often pushed as a means to clean
up electricity generation, they also provide rents to the industries that are included in the
RPS by protecting them from market competition with other generators. I explore the
association between RPS and carbon emissions. I collect data from 1960 to 2017 on
factors related to environmental quality, energy production, and state economic factors.
The data’s availability varies, however, so the most expansive variables are from 1960 to
2015 while many others fall into a shorter timeframe. The dataset relies heavily on the
State Energy Data System (SEDS) that the Department of Energy’s Energy Information
Administration (EIA) maintains, but also draws from a variety of other academic sources.
Other variables, such as the dates of electricity market restructuring, I collect myself from
primary sources. After accounting for existing linear trends in the data there appears to be
no statistically significant relationship with RPS and carbon emissions.
(60 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Renewable Portfolio Standards and Environmental Goals
Josh T. Smith

Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are one of the most common state policies
meant to encourage clean energy use. They require that utilities purchase electricity from
certain qualifying electricity generators, usually with no reference to the cost of that
electricity. Although RPS are meant to clean up electricity generation through using clean
energy sources instead of fossil fuels, they may not do so effectively. Further, some
energy companies may lobby state legislators to include their energy sources regardless
of their actual environmental benefit. The actual relationship between enacting an RPS
and a state’s emissions from energy production is unclear. I explore RPS associations
with carbon emissions. I collect data from 1960 to 2017 on factors related to
environmental quality, energy production, and state economic factors. The data
availability varies, however, so the most expansive variables are from 1960 to 2017 while
many others fall into a shorter timeframe. The dataset relies heavily on the State Energy
Data System (SEDS) that the Department of Energy’s Energy Information
Administration (EIA) maintains, but also draws from a variety of other academic sources.
Other variables, such as the dates of electricity market restructuring, I collect myself from
primary sources. After accounting for existing linear trends in the data there appears to be
no statistically significant relationship with RPS and carbon emissions.

v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe many individuals an acknowledgment for their assistance on this project
and throughout my graduate program. My committee who has put up with my careening
from research question to research question and provided guidance on which are most
promising. In particular, Bill Shughart, whose public choice theory class shaped my
approach to the world and to policy questions more than any other class. Dr. Depew and
Dr. Bosworth remained invaluable throughout in helping provide econometric guidance
and serving as not just sounding boards, but strong critics of my work that ultimately
improved this paper and my econometric skills.
I will claim all the remaining errors, but credit each of these individuals for the
good ideas.
Josh T. Smith

vi

CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... iii
PUBLIC ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................................................v
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ vi
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... vii
Renewable Portfolio Standards and Environmental Goals .................................................1
RPS Goals and History ...........................................................................................3
Overview of Methods, Findings, and Implications .................................................9
Previous Work on RPS .....................................................................................................11
Why do States Enact RPS? ...................................................................................13
What Environmental Effects do RPS Have? ........................................................14
What Economic Costs do RPS Have? ..................................................................17
My Contribution to the Literature .........................................................................19
Data Sources and Explanation ..........................................................................................20
Empirical Methods: Simple DD Model ............................................................................24
Simple DD Model and Assumptions ....................................................................25
Including State Specific Trends in the DD Model .............................................................30
Introducing Trends to the Simple DD Model .......................................................31

vii

The Parallel Trends Assumption is Likely Violated .............................................31
Accounting for the Trends ....................................................................................39
Graphical Verification of the Results ...................................................................41
Future Work on RPS ..........................................................................................................43
Summary of Results ..............................................................................................44
Future Projects ......................................................................................................44

viii

LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page
1

RPS Enactment Dates .........................................................................................3

2

CO2 and RPS Regression .................................................................................28

3

Check for Trends (1990 through 1996 Test) .....................................................28

4

Robustness Check Using an Unbalanced Panel Test for Interactions...............37

5

Results When Accounting for Linear, Quadratic, and Cubic Trends ...............39

6

CO2 and RPS Accounting for a Linear Trend and Controls.............................40

ix

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1

State RPS Map ...................................................................................................2

2
3

Carbon Emissions in RPS States .........................................................................7
Carbon Emissions in Non-RPS States ................................................................8

4

Average CO2 Emissions for RPS and Non-RPS States ......................................8

5

Graphical Representation of the DD Model .....................................................32

6

CO2 Emissions Before the Majority of RPS Enactments (1990-1996) ............33

7

Average Logged CO2 Emissions by Year (1990-2015) ...................................34

8

Event Time Graphical Investigation of the Results: Seven years before and
after enactment................................................................................................41

1

CHAPTER 1
RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS

2

Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are a common state-level policy that require
electricity providers in a state to use certain sources of electricity as a percentage of their
electricity-generating portfolio. The amount of required electricity from qualifying
sources starts at a low level and then rises to a final ceiling. According to the Database of
State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE), 29 states and Washington DC
have adopted binding RPS. Several other states, such as Utah and Kansas, have voluntary
standards. Figure 1 from DSIRE shows a map of state RPS as of February of 2017.

Figure 1. State RPS Map from the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and
Efficiency.1

http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Renewable-PortfolioStandards.pdf
1

3

RPS Goals and History
RPS primarily were enacted to promote the use of low-carbon, or clean, energy
sources. As one of many policies adopted to climate change, they are intended to reduce
carbon emissions and prevent environmental pollution. Clean energy advocates claim that
RPS will boost economic growth and create jobs, and some enacting legislation includes
this as a goal of the policy, but economic goals are secondary goals to the environmental
purposes of an RPS.
State requirements vary under RPS, as DSIRE’s map makes clear. For example,
New Hampshire’s RPS requires that 25.2 percent of its electricity be generated from
qualifying energy sources by 2025.2 Texas, instead of requiring a percentage of the
energy mix, requires that 10,000 megawatts (MWs) of electricity be produced from
renewables by 2025.3
The timing of RPS enactments also varies widely. Iowa enacted the first RPS in
1983. Other states began adopting renewable portfolio standards in the following years.
Table 1 displays the enactment dates updated from previous studies of RPS (Upton &
Snyder 2017; Lyon, 2015). Kansas and West Virginia both repealed their RPS in early
2015. Kansas in May and West Virginia in February. Extending Upton & Snyder (2017),
my timeline also includes Vermont’s 2015 enactment of an RPS.
Table 1
RPS Enactment Dates Updated from Upton & Snyder (2017) and Lyon (2015)4

State

Year RPS Enacted

http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/2523
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/182
4 Blanks indicate that no RPS has been enacted in that state. These dates are updated from Upton and
Snyder (2017) and Lyon (2015).
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3
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Alaska

No RPS

Alabama

No RPS

Arkansas

No RPS

Arizona

2001

California

2002

Colorado

2004

Connecticut

1999

Delaware

2005

Florida

No RPS

Georgia

No RPS

Hawaii

2004

Iowa

1983

Idaho

No RPS

Illinois

No RPS

Indiana

No RPS

Kansas

2009 (repealed 2015)

Kentucky

No RPS

Louisiana

No RPS

Massachusetts

1997

Maryland

2004

Maine

1999

Michigan

2008

Minnesota

1997

Missouri

2008

5

Mississippi

No RPS

Montana

2005

North Carolina

2007

North Dakota

No RPS

Nebraska

No RPS

New Hampshire

2007

New Jersey

2001

New Mexico

2002

Nevada

1997

New York

2004

Ohio

2008

Oklahoma

No RPS

Oregon

2007

Pennsylvania

2004

Rhode Island

2004

South Carolina

No RPS

South Dakota

No RPS

Tennessee

No RPS

Texas

1999

Utah

No RPS

Virginia

No RPS

Vermont

2015

Washington

2006

Wisconsin

1999

6

West Virginia
Wyoming

2009 (repealed 2015)
No RPS

Most RPS enactments occur through normal political means. State legislatures
enact them after a period of discussion and debate. Arizona, however, originally created a
solar only standard through the Arizona Corporation Commission, which is the state’s
public utility commission. Eventually the state expanded the RPS to include more than
solar. When Iowa enacted its RPS, long legal disputes ensued, but those eventually were
resolved and RPS went into effect.
There is extensive public debate in states with RPS revolving the appropriate
levels to set. California and some other states, for example, raise their RPS goals
occasionally from the initial levels set under the first bill. States without RPS often
consider enacting them and two states, West Virginia and Kansas, have repealed their
RPS in response to worries about RPS driving increases in electricity rates and concerns
about economic costs.
The environmental goal of lowering carbon emissions is the primary aim of RPS.
Figure 2 shows the carbon emissions for states that enacted an RPS.

7
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Figure 2. Carbon Emissions in RPS States (calculated from EIA Data)
Carbon emissions have been stable overall from 1990 to 2015 in RPS states. As Figure 3
shows, a similar trend holds for non-RPS states.
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CO2 (Million Metric Tons) for Non-RPS States
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Figure 3. Carbon Emissions in Non-RPS States (calculated from EIA Data)
The average difference in CO2 emissions between RPS states and non-RPS states is
small. Figure 4 shows that the two groups of states are at relatively similar levels and
appear to behave in similar manners on average.
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Figure 4: Average CO2 Emissions for RPS and Non-RPS States (calculated from EIA
Data)

Figures 2, 3, and 4 do not reveal an obvious relationship between an RPS and
lower carbon emissions. This makes a more rigorous statistical analysis an interesting
research question.
Overview of Methods, Findings, and Implications
To investigate the relationship between RPS and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
I estimate a simple difference-in-differences (DD) model that controls for state fixed
effects and time fixed effects. Initial modeling reveals a statistically significant reduction
in CO2 of about five percent. This relationship is robust to several controls but fades out
when a control for total energy consumption is added to the model. It appears an RPS
decreases carbon emissions by lowering overall consumption of energy. This is in line
with the findings of previous research that posits that an RPS may raise electricity prices
and thus push down electricity consumption (Upton & Snyder 2017).
The model cannot attribute those emissions declines to the RPS, however,
because of the pre-existing trends. Instead, what appears to be happening is that RPS
states likely enact many environmental policies that target emissions. The cumulative
effect of those regulations does appear to lower emissions. Accurately attributing the
emissions reduction to any single policy is difficult to justify. States with an RPS, for
example, likely have a powerful environmental lobbying sector responsible for originally
passing the RPS. This lobby likely is interested in other environmental protections and so
there is a fundamental difference between RPS states and non-RPS states that a DD
model cannot adequately address. This relationship may drive the results found in other
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work on RPS employing the DD method as well.
The state fixed effects and the time fixed effects control for time invariant factors
such as the qualities of renewable energy resources in a state or the culture of a state. Yet
the fixed effects for states and years may not properly account for the existing trends in
states before the enactment of an RPS. Although a DD model mimics an experimental
design by creating treated and untreated groups for comparison, the enactment of RPS is
unlikely to be random and so does not meet all of the standards for interpreting the
research design as a true natural experiment. As I ultimately show, there are preexisting
trends in states that enact RPS that do not exist in non-RPS states. So RPS states may not
be on a parallel trend, sometimes called a parallel path, with non-RPS states, thereby
rendering any DD model’s findings as spurious and unreliable.
After accounting for the pre-existing policy state-specific policy heterogeneity by
introducing trend variables, the model predicts no statistically significant relationship
between RPS and lower emissions of CO2. These results extend past findings (Upton &
Snyder 2017), which did not account for the state trends that existed before the RPS was
enacted. These state trends, however vary by state and if not accounted for, lead to
spurious results in statistical models.
The inclusion of linear trends is a unique contribution to the study of RPS and
emissions as well as possibly a unique contribution to the growing number of studies
exploring the impacts of RPS.
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CHAPTER 2
PREVIOUS WORK ON RPS

12

There are several common strands in the previous academic literature on RPS.
Individual studies rarely silo themselves neatly into a single branch. Three areas in
particular stand out as involving most of the academic work on RPS. First, one of the
largest branches of research on RPS examines the factors contributing to the enactment of
an RPS. Broadly, it finds that political factors such as ideology, party affiliation, and
voter preferences are important predictors of RPS enactment in addition to renewable
resource potential in the state. Second, as a primarily environmental policy, researchers
regularly examine the environmental benefits of RPS such as projected carbon abatement
and increased renewable energy capacity built. Finally, perhaps one of the most
controversial areas of research in political circles is the effect RPS have on electricity
prices. Most research here finds that RPS increase electricity prices (Tra 2016; Upton &
Snyder 2017).
I fit into all three of these veins of research. The dataset I ultimately develop will
be used in projects that directly contribute to each of these strands in future work. For
example, other studies of RPS enactment have not accounted for whether or not a state
restructured its electricity market. There are important questions with this question alone
for all three research areas. Restructuring may have a differential influence on whether an
RPS is enacted, how well it achieves its environmental goals, and how costly the policy
is. For example, do more competitive electricity markets lower or enhance the
environmental benefits created by an RPS? Or similarly for the economic costs area, do
restructured markets make RPS more or less economically costly? And finally, are states
that enact an RPS also more likely to pursue restructuring? Perhaps because of an
underlying desire to promote innovative energy policies? Each of these questions merit
their own investigation and study, but my novel dataset is a step towards answering each
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of them.
Why do States Enact RPS?
The enactment of an RPS is meant to serve multiple goals. As such, previous
literature on why states adopt RPS examines the influence of: environmental interest
groups, fossil fuel interest groups, political ideology, neighboring states’ policies, and
renewable energy resource quality.
Research on RPS adoption has long shown the importance of political factors
such as the size and relative powers of competing interest groups (Chupp 2011; Lyon &
Yin 2010; Matisoff 2008; Fowler 2013). Fowler (2013) concludes that the political
factors like partisanship and political culture are most important in RPS adoption.
Lyon and Yin (2010) provide an exhaustive test of multiple hypotheses and find a
variety of interesting results. For example, Lyon and Yin hypothesize that states with
lower air quality may be more likely to enact RPS so that they can improve their state’s
air quality, but they ultimately reject this hypothesis even when examining the adoption
of in-state requirements. They find that having a greater number of Democrats in the state
legislature increases the likelihood that states will adopt an RPS, but also that the
governor’s party is inconsequential. Two primary results of interest that fit into the
interest-group theory of regulation from Olson (1960) are that Lyon and Yin find that the
presence of well-organized renewable energy interest groups is associated with a 19 times
increase in the likelihood of a state adopting an RPS. Similarly, a heavy reliance on
natural gas decreases the likelihood that a state will adopt an RPS.
Huang, Alavalapati, Carter, and Langholtz (2007) investigate whether the
adoption of an RPS by states is random. They find that education levels and the political
party in power are two of the most important predictors. Matisoff (2008) investigates a
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similar question on whether or not neighboring states’ policies push states to adopt an
RPS and finds that citizen demands for an RPS are better explanations than is diffusion
from one state to another. Chandler (2009) by contrast, concludes that neighbor diffusion
variables are important. Chandler’s findings, however, use a broader definition of RPS
that includes energy efficiency standards as well as the RPS that Matisoff investigates.
That may still pick up the influence of neighboring states since it is not necessarily true
that the diffusion must be for exactly the same policy. More recent work by Carley
Nicholson-Crotty, and Miller (2017) shows geographical peers are most important in
diffusion, but that ideological peers are most important in terms of reinventing policies.
Renewable energy resources are another common predictor of whether or not a
state adopts an RPS. Lyon and Yin (2010) find that biomass resources are not related to
adoption, but that wind and solar resources are. This finding has been verified in other
works as well (Upton & Snyder 2015).
Carley and Miller (2012) investigate why states may adopt a more or less
stringent RPS. They find that there is stratification between the contributing factors by
stringency factors. More stringent standards are driven by different factors than are less
stringent factors. State-level citizen ideology is a significant predictor for voluntary and
weaker RPS. Stronger policy designs are more affected by the government level ideology
than citizen ideology.
What Environmental Effects do RPS Have?
RPS incentivize the use of renewable energy and deter the use of fossil fuels.
Ultimately, this is meant to lower carbon emissions and the emissions of other pollutants
(Wiser et al. 2017). Using the Regional Energy Development System to project several
scenarios, researchers at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory estimated that RPS
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create between $97 billion and $161 billion worth of benefits, most of which come from
reduced pollution and the corresponding health effects (Wiser et al. 2017). These benefit
estimates follow from the more conservative assumptions based on existing RPS policies
and far outstrip their cost estimates. Other work using similar modeling techniques like
the National Energy Modeling System have made similar projections (Kydes 2007).
One worry about these estimates, however, is that RPS may not actually
contribute to expanded renewable energy generation capacity. A contentious point in the
literature concerns the effect RPS have on the development of additional renewable
energy capacity. Some early work found increasing renewable energy capacity in the
states that enacted RPS (Kydes 2007; Carley 2009; Yin & Powers 2010; Eastin 2014).
Yin and Powers (2010) develops a measure of RPS stringency for its analysis and finds
that RPS are associated with higher levels of in-state renewable energy development but
note that it is sensitive to when renewable energy credits (RECs) trading is allowed.
RECs are the compliance mechanism for states with RPS. Electricity generators earn
RECs by generating electricity from the qualifying sources in the RPS and can either
retire them against their own obligation to produce renewable energy or sell them. Some
states allow REC trading across state borders while others do not.
Some studies of RPS enactment and renewable energy deployment show mixed
results. Even Carley (2009), though she finds that an RPS is associated with increased
capacity, does not find evidence of increased electricity generation from renewable
energy sources. Kniefel and Shrimali (2011) find that an RPS increases deployment of
geothermal and solar while decreasing the use of other renewable sources like wind and
biomass. Maguire (2016) finds that the enactment of an RPS seems to be unrelated to the
growth of wind power within states. Maguire and Munasib (2016), by contrast, employ a
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synthetic control model and find strong evidence of the effect of RPS on renewable
energy deployment only in Texas. Texas is unique. It met its RPS obligation several years
ahead of schedule and even though the RPS is legally binding, it may not have been an
economically binding constraint on electricity providers in the state. Maguire and
Munasib contend that a synthetic control method (SCM) is a more appropriate method
than previous studies employed because state RPS vary widely. Another paper employed
a difference-in-differences (DD) method and a SCM for comparison and found no
evidence of increased renewable energy capacity associated with the enactment of an
RPS (Upton and Snyder 2017). Although they are not specific to the effect of an RPS,
analyses of incentive programs for specific energy sources such as wind and solar
consistently find that they increase deployment of the supported energy source even
though the effect of the RPS is not always statistically significant (Hitaj 2012; Lasco &
Chernyakhovskiy, 2016).
If RPS are not associated with increased renewable energy development in states
that enact them, there is good reason to doubt they will achieve their environmental goals.
Yet only a few estimates of the relationship between emissions and RPS exist. Upton and
Snyder (2017) do characterize their evidence of an emissions reduction as weak and
attribute it to the increase in prices associated with an RPS and the resulting lower total
demand and not to increased reliance on renewable energy. Eastin (2014) finds evidence
of cleaner air at the 0.05 level and lower carbon emissions, but only at the 0.1 level.
Eastin also caveats that these findings may not be only because of the RPS, but rather the
full suite of policy options that states, municipalities, and federal groups offer to the
renewable energy industry. In an unpublished working paper, Sekar and Sohngen (2014)
investigate state-level carbon intensities after the implementation of an RPS and find a
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statistically significant decrease. They estimate the adoption of an RPS reduced total
carbon emissions in the United States by about four percent in 2010. They do not
attribute this decline to increasing renewable energy generation, but instead to the
increase in prices associated with RPS adoption that results in lower electricity
consumption.
Even if RPS do lower carbon emissions, some research suggests it is not a costeffective means to reach lower emissions. Modeling comparing a cap-and-trade policy to
RPS shows that an RPS is more expensive, but less expensive than a renewable energy
production tax credit (Palmer & Burtraw 2005).
What Economic Costs do RPS Have?
Early advocates and analyses of the likely effect of RPS argued that they would
provide environmental benefits in addition to lowering electricity prices. Although
speaking of an analysis of a federal RPS, Sovacool and Cooper (2007) summarize work
by the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Network for New Energy Choices, the U.S.
Energy Information Administration, and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
which all concluded that an RPS would lower electricity prices through economies of
scale. Advocates of renewable energy contest almost any link between RPS and higher
electricity prices (American Wind Energy Association 2013; Shahan 2014).
The academic literature is generally clear that adopting an RPS is associated with
higher electricity prices (Palmer and Burtraw 2005; Fischer 2009; Tra 2015; Upton and
Snyder 2015; Wang 2016; Upton and Snyder 2017). These results hold across a variety of
empirical methods and when including a variety of controls. Maguire and Munasib
(2018) appear to be unique in finding no price increase associated with the enactment of
Texas’s RPS. This is, however, likely a result that cannot be generalized outside of
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Texas.
Fischer (2009) models the conditions required for an RPS to lower electricity
prices. She finds that an RPS can lower electricity prices only when an RPS is set
between three and 7.5 percent. These are far smaller levels than those that states
commonly set as their ultimate standards. The price declines originally because decreased
demand for natural gas lowers electricity prices. Then prices rise as the implicit tax on
energy production from non-qualifying sources overwhelms the decline in natural gas
prices.
In addition to RPS’s association with electricity prices, researchers also often
investigate the effect of RPS on employment. Advocates of RPS generally claim that the
policy can both decrease carbon emissions and create jobs (Rabe 2007). Empirical
investigations of this claim, however, have found little relationship. In a working paper,
Boampong, Knapp, and Phillips (2016) find no evidence of a change in total
employment. Bowen (2013) however, finds no total job growth but does observe an
increase in green businesses associated with RPS adoption.
Importantly, however, some research contests the ability of RPS to serve both
economic and environmental goals simultaneously. A working paper by Bento, Garg, and
Kaffine (2017) finds that increasing RPS likely results in either large emissions savings
or large job growth in the renewable energy industry, but not both. They decompose the
effect of an RPS increase into three parts: a substitution effect, an output-tax, and an
output effect. The substitution effect is movement of capital from fossil fuel resources
and into renewable energy investment because of the pull of the subsidy. This effect can
create resource growth in the renewable energy industry. The output-tax occurs for a
similar reason when capital leaves the electricity industry, either fossil fuel or renewable,
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and is used in a composite sector instead. Together, the substitution and output-tax effect,
according to the researchers, are the two means for RPS compliance. That is, a standard
can be met by either increasing renewable energy generation or by lowering fossil fuel
energy production. The third and final effect the researchers discuss is the output effect,
which is caused by changes in prices because of the change in the RPS. As the price of
electricity rises, the composite good becomes relatively cheaper and consumers naturally
purchase less electricity and more of the composite.
My Contribution to the Literature
The existing literature on RPS and carbon emissions so far has assumed that the
DD models employed meet the background assumptions of parallel trends. Chapter 5
provides evidence that this assumption may not hold. There appears to be a difference
between RPS and non-RPS states that must be accounted for that previous work has
ignored.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA SOURCES AND EXPLANATIONS
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I collect the majority of data employed in the empirical testing from the State
Energy Database System (SEDS), which is run by the United States Department of
Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA).5 Broadly, SEDS includes the
production and use of energy sources from 1960 to 2015 and the prices of energy
resources from 1970 to 2015. The EIA also provides data on emissions from 1990 to
2015 in a separate dataset.6 The separate dataset calculates emissions based on the SEDS
data by multiplying certain fuel sources by “carbon coefficients” that represent how much
carbon is generated from using each fuel source. One note about this data, however, is
that it excludes carbon emissions from biomass by assuming that biomass emissions will
be a lifecycle net zero since new biomass will be planted to replace the burned biomass.
Energy from biomass is only a small portion of total energy consumption and so is
unlikely to affect the results.
For robustness checks I also collected data provided by the Institute for Public
Policy and Social Research (IPPSR) at Michigan State University and the University of
Kentucky Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR) on political and economic factors that
may also influence RPS emissions.7 The IPPSR (2017) data is from a project to combine
datasets involving state policy factors for use by other researchers and ultimately foster
further research. Its data’s timeline varies widely based on the original study that it is
pulled from, but the variables I use generally run from 1980 to 2015.
The UKCPR’s (2017) data is a state-level dataset maintained for use in policy

U.S. Energy Information Administration. State Energy Data System (SEDS): 1960-2015. June 30, 2017.
Retrieved from https://www.eia.gov/state/seds/seds-data-complete.php?sid=US
6 U.S. Energy Information Administration. State Carbon Dioxide Emissions Data. Energy Information
Administration. January 22, 2018. https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/ /
7 Jordan, Marty P. and Matt Grossmann. 2016. The Correlates of State Policy Project v1.14. East Lansing,
MI: Institute for Public Policy and Social Research (IPPSR).; University of Kentucky Center for Poverty
Research. 2017. “UKCPR National Welfare Data, 1980-2016.” Gatton College of Business and Economics,
University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY. Retrieved January 4, 2018 from http://www.ukcpr.org/data.
5
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analysis and academic work, particularly as it relates to questions of poverty. It generally
runs from 1980 to 2015. My preferred model’s results generally are robust to the
inclusion of these variables and s
ince they are not the central factor in my research question, I do not include them in the
baseline model.
I also constructed a binary variable for whether or not a state’s electricity market
is a restructured or a vertically integrated market. A vertically integrated electricity
market is a state-granted natural monopoly on electricity generation, transmission, and
distribution. Generation is the creation of electricity that is then transmitted along high
voltage power lines and eventually distributed along lower voltage lines for use by
electricity consumers. A restructured electricity market, by contrast, breaks up the
monopoly and allows competition in the generation market (Lien 2008).8
To be clear, restructuring electricity markets is too diverse a policy change to be
represented accurately by a binary variable. Although many states restructured their
electricity markets, the extent and type of restructuring does not collapse to a binary
factor and retain much of its meaning. Not only do states begin restructuring processes
and then halt them, as in the cases of states like California, Montana, and New Mexico,
but they restructure in fundamentally different ways. The adoption and acceptance of
restructuring by electricity customers varies widely. Texas follows a retail choice model
that creates a market for electricity similar to markets for any other good or service that
covers most of the state. Consumers within the competitive electricity markets in Texas
may enter their zip code on powertochoose.org and browse the plans, sometimes the

Lien, Jeff. “Electricity Restructuring: What Has Worked, What Has Not, and What is Next.” Economic
Analysis Group Discussion Paper. April 2008. Retrieved from
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2008/04/30/232692.pdf
8
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hundreds of plans. Another confounding factor is that Texas’s model is facilitated by the
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), which lies entirely within Texas and
therefore is state-controlled. State-control grants ERCOT much more latitude than other
electricity markets receive. By contrast, Virginia allows only a small portion of its
electricity consumers to participate in the restructured market.
The EIA maintained a map of restructured electricity markets but discontinued the
updates in 2003 (EIA 2003).9 Other sources do not provide clear and consistent
definitions of restructured in their own data. Electricchoice.com, for example, maintains a
small database of the current restructuring trends at the state-level and counts Virginia as
a restructured state.10 The implications of restructuring electricity markets on emissions
and electricity prices deserves its own investigation in future projects.
None of these datasets timelines match perfectly with each other. Since I am
primarily interested in the relationship of RPS with CO2 emissions I limit the data used
in my empirical modeling to only the 26 years contained in the emissions data, 1990 to
2015. This is the timeline I have complete data for each of my variables. Ultimately, the
dataset I create can serve as a basis for future projects on RPS and related environmental
or energy questions.

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). “Status of State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity.”
February 2003.
10 Electric Choice. “Map of Deregulated Energy States and Markets.” 2017. Retrieved from
https://www.electricchoice.com/map-deregulated-energy-markets/
9

24

CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL METHODS: SIMPLE DD MODEL
I estimate two primary difference-in-differences (DD) models. First, a simple DD
model with state and year fixed effects to examine the association of an RPS with
emissions. The second more complicated model, explained in chapter 5, includes the first
model, but importantly also includes controls for pre-existing trends that allows for state
heterogeneity in trends before an RPS is ever enacted. I find some evidence that quadratic
and cubic trends may be necessary, but the linear trend is likely justified. I present the
results from those models as well in the next chapter. This second model’s insight into
how state-specific trends affect the results of DD models is a unique contribution to the
study of RPS.
A DD model will show the total effect of the policy and later controls can be
included in order to investigate the channels that an RPS may work through. In the case
of an RPS, controls can be added to the model to reveal if an RPS is working as it is
intended. That is, does an RPS work by increasing investment in renewable energy
technologies, or if there are other channels an RPS is associated with emissions through.
Even though an RPS is meant to reduce carbons by encouraging the use of lower
carbon sources of energy, it may reduce carbon in other ways. For example, an RPS
could raise electricity prices and thereby lower the amount of electricity demanded by
consumers. This lower electricity demand would in turn lower emissions from utilities.
Another mechanism that is likely lowering carbon emissions is the switch from coal to
natural gas. Natural gas is less carbon intensive than coal, meaning it produces greater
amounts of electricity for each unit of carbon emissions. Given that the fracking boom
occurs during the data’s timeline, this is a possible confounding factor. The theory of the
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environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) may also play a factor in any statistical estimate of
reduced emissions associated with an RPS. The EKC argues that the demand for
environmental quality is not a linear function. Poor people are less concerned with their
environmental quality and the environment’s cleanliness. Economic development thus
originally contributes to declining environmental quality as individuals create pollutants.
At some level of wealth, however, an inversion point is reached, and the richer
individuals begin demanding cleaner environments. As individuals become wealthier
they may invest in environmental policies, including the RPS but not limited to it, that
improve environmental quality.
Each of these factors relates to the channels through which an RPS may improve
environmental health and prevent climate change. They all complicate the theoretical
story of how an RPS works (inducing additional use of clean energy sources) because
they may be causing other actions that lower carbon emissions. By adding in control
variables, however, the original and simple model can be expanded to investigate a more
nuanced relationship between an RPS and carbon emissions.
Simple DD Model and Assumptions
I use a simple difference-in-differences (DD) model that controls for state fixed
effects and time fixed effects to investigate the relationship between RPS and carbon
dioxide (CO2). The state fixed effects and the time fixed effects control for time invariant
factors such as the quality of renewable energy resources in a state or the culture of a
state.
DD models mimic an experimental design by creating treated and untreated
groups for comparison. Importantly, DD models assume that the treated and untreated
states have parallel trends before the treatment. The assumption is simply that if the
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treated group had gone untreated, then it would have behaved the same as the untreated
group. That is, states cannot be moving in opposite directions prior to the treatment or
trending at different rates prior to the treatment. If states are not on parallel trends, then
the DD will incorrectly estimate the coefficient on the DD variable. It can overestimate or
underestimate the coefficient depending on the trend. The parallel trends assumption
requires that the factors affecting the control and the treatment groups were the same
before the treatment, and only after the treatment is applied do the states change. As I go
on to show in chapter 5, the fundamental problem with this simple DD model is that it
cannot examine a true “counterfactual” because the parallel trends assumption is violated.
Each model of emissions and RPS can be understood using the following
equation:
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠',) = 𝑅𝑃𝑆',) + 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐹𝐸' + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸) + 𝜈',) + 𝜀',) .

(1)

The left-hand side simply is the emissions of CO2 in metric tons. The first independent
variable on the right-hand side is the DD estimator, a binary variable indicating whether
or not an RPS exists in that state in that year. The next two variables are state and year
fixed effects that account for time-invariant unobserved variables. The controls are
represented by 𝑣',) . Controls vary in the models I present but include natural gas use and
total energy use. The final variable is simply the unobserved factors.
I estimate three variants of equation one to examine the relationship between
carbon emissions and RPS. The first only includes the RPS and fixed effects for states
and years. This is the baseline model and in then include controls in the second and third
models. Splitting the models like this serves as a robustness check for the first model’s
results. It allows researchers to examine the channels that an RPS, or other policy
instrument, works through. The controls can provide a more nuanced view of how the
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RPS affects emissions. For example, in the second model I control for the total
consumption of natural gas because carbon emissions are falling in part because of the
switch from coal to natural gas. In particular, previous research shows that as the amount
of renewable energy generation grows in an area, more natural gas is consumed because
natural gas plants are less expensive backups for variable renewable energy sources
(Verdolini et. al, 2016).
In the case of RPS and CO2 emissions, I want to estimate the decrease in CO2
associated with an increase in the use of the qualifying energy sources and not because of
greater reliance on natural gas. So, the second model includes the log of total natural gas
consumption for each state. Similarly, in the third model I also control for total energy
consumption in the third variation of the CO2 model. The same natural gas theory holds
for total energy consumption. I am primarily interested in the decrease in emissions from
the increased use of renewable energy technologies and not because energy consumption
decreases in response to an RPS. Including total energy consumption also serves as a
robustness check for the RPS variable. I predict that as total energy consumption
increases, carbon emissions will similarly increase.11
Table 2 displays results from three variations of the model estimating the

11

In addition to these three models, I also investigated other theories on CO2 emissions from the literature,
but they do not affect the model’s primary results and are not presented. First, per capita income in 2016
dollars to account for any confounding effects that wealth may have. Income should be positively related to
carbon emissions as wealthier people will likely consume more energy. I also included a squared term for
the per capita income variable. This can be understood as a control for the Environmental Kuznets Curve as
well. The U.S. in 1990, when the emissions data begins, was likely already on the downward sloping
portion of the curve so it is unlikely this a major factor in emissions. Second, I controlled for whether or not
the Governor of the state is a Democrat as a high-level proxy for how many other environmental programs
the state has enacted and how environmentally conscious the state’s citizens residents are. Having a
Democratic governor is likely negatively related to emissions. None of these inclusions, however,
meaningfully changed the direction or size of the coefficient of interest and likely introduce some amount
of endogeneity and so are excluded. The party affiliation variable is also likely changing too slowly to have
a large influence considering the fixed effects included in the base model.
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relationship between RPS and carbon emissions.12
Table 2
CO2 and RPS Regression
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

VARIABLES

Simple DD

DD w/ Controls 1

DD w/ Controls 2

DD w/ Controls 3

RPS

-0.0494**

-0.0539***

-0.0144

-0.0178

(0.0204)

(0.0191)

(0.0148)

(0.0143)

Log(Natural Gas
Consumption)

0.0721*

0.0335***

(0.0397)

(0.0130)

Log(Total Energy
Consumption)
Constant

0.659***

0.634***

(0.0731)

(0.0739)

3.569***

2.661***

-5.876***

-5.944***

(0.0140)

(0.503)

(1.048)

(1.089)

Observations

1,300

1,300

1,300

1,300

R-squared

0.99

0.99

0.99

0.99

Number of States

50

50

50

50

State FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3.30 (0.0692)

81.26 (0.000)

76.43 (0.000)

F Stat (p-value)

Notes. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1)
Models 1 and 2 show a statistically significant decrease in carbon emissions of

Lags and leads of three years had no meaningful influence on these results and were not statistically
significant. Including the state’s governor’s party, logged population, and real per capita income (in 2016
dollars) did not alter the results.
12
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about five percent. The significance, however, is sensitive to the inclusion of total energy
demand in model 3. This suggests that an RPS may work through decreasing total energy
demand. Model 4 simply includes both controls to demonstrate robustness. Controlling
for both total energy consumption and natural gas consumption means that an increase or
decrease in natural gas now cannot change the total amount of energy consumed in a state
in that year. Any increase in natural gas must now result in a decrease in the use of other
energy sources. How this affects carbon emissions will depend on the energy generation
portfolio of sources. From 1990 to 2015, much of the energy was generated by coal.
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CHAPTER 5
INCLUDING STATE-SPECIFIC TRENDS IN THE DD MODEL
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Introducing Trends to the Simple DD Model
In chapter 5, I demonstrate the influence of the linear trend on the variable and
further discuss the parallel trends assumption and how it is violated. The data employed
in the earlier DD model does not satisfy the technical assumption of “parallel paths” for
DD models. The assumption’s violation is likely responsible for the statistical
significance of the estimated relationship between RPS enactment and CO2 emissions
since including controls for the trend eliminates the significance. In this chapter I show
how the parallel paths assumption is not met and that there are likely state linear trends
and possibly higher order trends that must be accounted for to make the predictions from
the DD model accurate. Even after accounting for these trends, skepticism is justified.
The Parallel Trends Assumption is Likely Violated
Parallel trends, or sometimes called common trends or parallel paths, is a bedrock
assumption of DD models that is often simply taken as given. It holds that before the
treatment, both the untreated and treated groups were following parallel paths. The
parallel paths assumption guarantees that the differences tested before and after treatment
are due to the treatment and not to underlying trends. Without it, there is no guarantee
that the results are accurate, reliable, or unbiased.
The trends that the parallel paths assumption prohibits are separate trends than
simple time trends that the time fixed effects variables control for. Instead, they represent
the key to DD’s identification strategy. Regressions using differences-in-differences
assumes that without the treatment the treated group and the untreated group would
continue along a common trend. It then exploits a treatment of a subset of the group to
formally consider the counter-factual of what would have happened without the
treatment. If the two groups were not on a common trend before the treatment, however,
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then the treatment variable will not be correctly estimated. The effect may be
overestimated or underestimated depending on the trend. For example, Figure 5
graphically shows the theory of a DD model.

Figure 5. Graphical Representation of the DD Model13
Even though the two groups shown in Figure 2 are not on the exact same path, the
distance between them is constant until the treatment is applied. This allows researchers
to exploit the difference between the treated and untreated groups to consider what could
have happened without the treatment and thus establish the treatment’s effect.
The use of parallel is important because the assumption does not require that the
two groups be on the same path, but rather simply that the paths head in generally the
same direction. If RPS states have consistently higher emissions, for example, but it is by
approximately constant levels before the RPS was enacted, this would not violate the

This figure is taken from Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health’s website:
https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/research/population-health-methods/difference-difference-estimation
13
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parallel paths requirement.
A violation of the parallel paths assumption is when the treated and untreated
groups are not simply at different levels of the variable of interest, but rather when they
are traveling in different directions. Parallel lines never cross, diverge, or converge. If the
data before RPS enactment shows divergence, for example, then this assumption is likely
violated and the results of any DD analysis using the data will be spurious. Figure 6 does
not clearly demonstrate that divergence, however. Note that the data is limited to 19901996 because the first RPS enactments in my data begin to appear in 1997 and 1999
(although Iowa enacted in 1983).

Figure 6. CO2 Emissions Before the Majority of RPS Enactments (1990-1996)
Figure 7 contains the full range of data from 1990 to 2015 to provide a picture of
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the overall trend. It shows that carbon emissions from RPS states are declining more
quickly.

Figure 7. Average Logged CO2 Emissions by Year (1990-2015)
As depicted, although the CO2 emissions in 1990 are relatively close, the gap
between RPS and non-RPS states grows throughout time. It is clear that the emissions of
RPS states, shown in blue, are on a diverging path from the states without an RPS, shown
in red. It is not clear from these graphs, however, if the parallel trends assumption is
violated. From 1990 to 1996 there appears to be little to no divergence before the
treatment, RPS enactment, is applied to the states. Figures 3 and 4 show that RPS states
have lower emissions before they even enact an RPS. This is not a problem for the
assumptions undergirding DD analyses. The growing gap between the two types of states

35

does suggest that the parallel trends assumption should be investigated statistically. The
gap could indicate that there is a trend that distinguishes RPS and non-RPS states that
should be accounted for.
Demonstrating the Trend
Demonstrating the trend is a difficult endeavor, but the simplest way is to create a
linear variable to feed into the regression, then create a policy variable, and finally to
interact the two and consider if the trend is merely linear or quadratic or an even higher
order relationship. The most straightforward test is then an F test to compare a restricted
model to an unrestricted model. The results indicate that at least a linear trend is needed.
These tests will estimate whether states that enacted a policy were trending differently
than states that did not enact a policy.
Equation one can be modified to represent these tests:
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠',) = 𝑅𝑃𝑆',) + 𝜃' + 𝛿) + 𝜏' 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑) + 𝜀',) .

(2)

Additional trends, quadratic and cubic, can be included in the regression model. Table 3
includes the trend, the policy variable, and the interaction term between the two. I also
restrict the regression so that when a state drops out once it enacts an RPS. The negative
and significant interaction terms indicate there is at least a linear trend related to states
enacting an RPS and verifies the divergence prior to treatment that renders the simple DD
model’s findings spurious. If the RPS coefficient in the DD model was negative, but the
interaction was positive, then that would provide evidence that the original results were
correct. Because it would work against the argument that RPS states are on a divergent
path from non-RPS states where their emissions decline at a faster rate because of a
preexisting trend. It would still be difficult to know the actual effect of an RPS, but it
would support the original findings direction.

36

To check the existence of the trend, I restrict the regression to data before 1997.
This is because only Iowa, since it enacted in 1983, has an RPS in this timeframe. This
tests the trends pre-treatment. Table 3 contains these results. It shows only a significant
linear trend. Note that this regression only contains 350 observations, seven years with 50
states in each year. This indicates that states that enact an RPS are on different trends
before an RPS is enacted that must be accounted for to accurately employ a DD model.
Table 3
Check for Trends (1990 through 1996 Test)14
VARIABLES
Policy

Linear Trend

Policy * Linear Trend

Quadratic Trend

Policy * Quadratic
Trend

Cubic Trend

(1)

(2)

(3)

Policy*Trend

Policy*Trend Quadratic

Policy*Trend Cubic

0.0799***

0.0362

(0.0143)

(0.0361)

0.0222***

0.00766

(0.00208)

(0.00665)

-0.00863**

0.00270

0.0331

(0.00356)

(0.0103)

(0.0305)

0.00181**

0.00466***

(0.000873)

(0.000886)

-0.00142

-0.0103

(0.00119)

(0.00767)
-0.000281**
(0.000129)

Policy * Cubic Trend

0.000741

Running this same regression with data through 1999, which only includes a few RPS enactments, shows
similar results.
14
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(0.000596)
Constant

3.541***

3.558***

3.566***

(0.00890)

(0.0101)

(0.00661)

350

350

350

0.999

0.999

0.999

State FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Linear Trend

Yes

Yes

Yes

Quadratic Trend

No

Yes

Yes

Cubic Trend

No

No

Yes

5.87 (0.0191)

3.72 (0.0315)

3.54 (0.0211)

Observations
R-squared

F Stat (p-value)

Notes. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1)
The results in Table 3 suggest that the interaction between the policy variable and
the linear trend is significant. This verifies the existence of the trend that could not earlier
be verified visually from the data. The F tests restrict each interaction term to zero and
provide statistical evidence that the trends should be included.
As a robustness check for the existence of a linear trend I run the same regression
as above, but as an unbalanced panel. States are in the regression until they enact an RPS.
Again, the linear trend and policy variable interaction term are significant and suggest a
linear trend. The quadratic and cubic trends, however, are not. The inclusion of the
interaction term is further verified by an F test.
Table 4
Robustness Check Using an Unbalanced Panel Test for Interactions
VARIABLES
Policy

(1)
Policy*Trend

(2)
Policy*Trend Quadratic

(3)
Policy*Trend Cubic

0.836***

0.830***

0.852***
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(0.0146)

(0.0197)

(0.0231)

Linear Trend

0.00572***
(0.00126)

0.0319***
(0.00333)

0.0261***
(0.00413)

Policy * Linear Trend

-0.00649***
(0.00187)

-0.00483
(0.00458)

-0.0147*
(0.00779)

-0.000970***
(0.000136)

-0.000485
(0.000371)

-7.88e-05

0.000936

(0.000162)

(0.000794)

Quadratic Trend

Policy* Quadratic
Trend

Cubic Trend

-9.81e-06
(9.75e-06)

Policy*Cubic Trend

-2.76e-05
(2.18e-05)

Constant

Observations
R-squared
State FE
Year FE
Linear Trend
Quadratic Trend
Cubic Trend
F Stat (p-value)

3.534***
(0.0155)

3.511***
(0.0160)

3.509***
(0.0162)

923
0.997
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
12.04 (0.0011)

923
0.997
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
9.01 (0.0005)

923
0.997
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
12.04 (0.0000)

Notes. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1)
The F tests in these models are also significant. The first F test restricting the
interaction term between the linear trend and the policy variable to zero returns an F
statistic of 12.04 and a p-value of less than 0.01. This indicates the interaction term likely
cannot be legitimately restricted to zero by removing it from the model. The second and
third F tests are significant at similar levels providing some evidence of quadratic trends
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and possibly cubic trends as well.
Accounting for the Trends
Now that the trends have been statistically verified they can be included in the
regression from the previous chapter to examine the association between RPS and carbon
emissions while controlling for the trend. The full results are excluded from the table so
that they fit on the page.
Table 5
Results When Accounting for Linear, Quadratic, and Cubic Trends
(1)
Policy*Trend

(2)
Policy*Trend Quadratic

(3)
Policy*Trend Cubic

RPS

0.0210
(0.0157)

0.0254*
(0.0134)

0.0224*
(0.0123)

Constant

3.615***

3.500***

3.486***

(0.00882)

(0.00870)

(0.00569)

1,300
0.998

1,300
0.999

1,300
0.999

State FE
Year FE

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Linear Trend

Yes

Yes

Yes

Quadratic Trend
Cubic Trend

No
No

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

VARIABLES

Observations
R-squared

Notes. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1)
The results in Table 5 show no statistically significant relationship between
carbon emissions and RPS at the traditional 0.05 level. The models with more than a
linear trend show a statistically significant increase in CO2 emissions, but below the
usual levels.
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To examine the mechanisms that an RPS may work through I now include the
logged total natural gas consumption and logged total electricity consumption with a
linear trend. The results are in Table 6 below. These tests provide a more nuanced view
an RPS’s relationship with carbon emissions by controlling for potential channels an RPS
may affect carbon emissions through.
Table 6
CO2 and RPS Accounting for a Linear Trend and Controls15
VARIABLES
RPS

(1)
Base
Model

(2)
NG

(3)
Total
Consumption

(4)
NG and Total
Consumption

0.0210
(0.0157)

0.0113
(0.0129)

0.00687
(0.0137)

0.00120
(0.0104)

Logged Total
Natural Gas
Consumption

0.124***

0.0894***

(0.0353)
Logged Total
Energy
Consumption

Constant

Observations
R-squared
State FE
Year FE
Clustered by
State
Linear Trend
Quadratic Trend
Cubic Trend
F Stat

0.721***

(0.0190)
0.654***

(0.0550)

(0.0566)

3.615***
(0.00882)

2.083***
(0.435)

-6.761***
(0.792)

-6.898***
(0.803)

1,300
0.998
Yes
Yes
Yes

1,300
0.998
Yes
Yes
Yes

1,300
0.999
Yes
Yes
Yes

1,300
0.999
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No
1.79
(0.1877)

Yes
No
No
12.42
(0.0009)

Yes
No
No
171.83 (0.0000)

Yes
No
No
91.68 (0.0000)

Notes. Standard errors clustered by states in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1)

15

Including residential electricity prices produces similar results.
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The results in Table 6 show no statistically significant relationship between CO2
and RPS enactment. Natural gas consumption and total energy consumption are both
positively related to carbon emissions. F tests restricting the inclusion of the controls
provide statistical evidence in favor of their inclusion in the model.
Graphical Verification of the Results
Figure 8 graphically displays the results from the previous regressions. It places
RPS enactment in event time and shows no coherent relationship between CO2 emissions
and RPS enactment at time zero.

Figure 8. Event Time Graphical Investigation of the Results: Seven years before and after
enactment.
There are many reasons an RPS may not have a statistically detectable
relationship with carbon emissions. The answer likely lies in how RPS states differ from
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non-RPS states. A state with an RPS is likely to have a powerful environmental lobby
that played an instrumental role in providing the political interest group to pass the RPS.
This lobby is unlikely to care only about enacting the RPS. Instead, it likely pushes for
many environmental rules and regulations and the RPS is simply one of many measures
pushing carbon emissions down in the state. The methods I employ may not be able to
isolate the effect of the RPS. Some previous literature has suggested that there is
significant interplay between policy instruments (Yi & Feiock 2012; Park 2015).
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CHAPTER 6
FUTURE WORK ON RPS AND IMPLICATIONS
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Summary of Results
The model of CO2 emissions and the enactment of renewable portfolio standards
(RPS) I develop and estimate is the first to account for state-level heterogeneity by
entering trend variables. The simple DD model that does not account for the preexisting
state emissions trends shows that RPS reduces carbon emissions by about five percent,
but those results may be unreliable. Instead, what is occurring is that the DD model
overestimates the effect of renewable portfolio standards because RPS states follow a
path distinct from non-RPS states. That divergence violates the parallel paths assumption
that DD models rely on. Once the pre-existing trends are accounted for, the DD models
provide no statistically significant evidence that a renewable portfolio standard has any
relationship with carbon emissions. Importantly, this study cannot definitively determine
if RPS achieve the environmental goals they aim to meet, but there are other econometric
techniques that may be better suited for similar research questions.
Future Projects
There are multiple avenues for future work on RPS. Chief among them is the need
for other statistical investigations with different tools. For example, other statistical
methods could be employed that may be more appropriate for the data’s limitations and
nature of the research question. Future researchers could examine cases where random
assignment or RPS enactment is a more robust assumption, but that approach likely is
impossible. Regulatory standards do not emerge randomly. Some states, however, may
better match this assumption than others (states with close elections, for example) and
thus better approximate the background assumptions of DD estimations. Another method
might be to match states with similar characteristics and examine the influence of an RPS
on those states instead of all treated states. This could investigate the effect of an RPS by
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providing a theoretical justification for ignoring certain confounding effects. Synthetic
control (SC) methods, however, are likely to be the most promising forward step in
researching the effects of RPS. Synthetics increasingly are common in empirical analyses
and could be applied to RPS.16 A chief advantage of SC methods is that they account for
the nonrandom treatment problem that DD methods cannot.
Theoretical modeling work could also examine the effects of different RPS
designs. For example, it could model the effects of an environmental performance
standard in place of a technology standard for RPS. Current standards include potentially
dirty energy sources while excluding some viable low carbon sources. There are several
commonly included energy sources on which environmental advocates disagree on. For
example, Mark Jacobson of the Stanford Solutions Project, the leader of a group of
academics that modeled how the United States and other countries could run on 100
percent renewable energy sources, excludes biomass because of concerns about its
environmental effects. In Pennsylvania, coal ash is included as a qualifying powergenerating resource. Nuclear is commonly identified as a strange energy source to
exclude from RPS mandates since it produces zero carbon energy. Perhaps even more
absurd, hydroelectric likewise is also often excluded (Stori 2013; The Hydropower
Reform Coalition 2014). The political economy of the design of these standards is also an
important question.
Another theoretical question for future examination is the effect of trading the
Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) that are used to monitor compliance with the RPS
between states. Each unit of electricity generated from a qualifying energy source creates
a REC that, in some states, can be traded across state lines (Berry & Jaccard 2001).

16

See Upton & Snyder (2017), Maguire & Mumasib (2018), and Maguire & Munasib (2016) for examples.
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Texas, by contrast, requires that all electricity used to meet its goal be generated in the
state and retired within the state (Center for Energy Economics 2009).
If the goal of an RPS is to lower emissions and ultimately prevent climate change,
then it should not matter where the carbon is abated. Climate change is a global problem
and if the RPS induces consumption of electricity from low carbon sources in place of
consumption of electricity from high carbon sources, portfolio standards could be seen as
successful. Some RPS legislation, however, prohibits or limits trading RECs from outside
of the state. These are, again, likely political economy questions about state-based energy
groups attempting to capture the rents RPS creates. Yet from a policy perspective,
restricting REC trading seems unlikely to facilitate lower emissions. This is especially
true considering that renewable energy resources vary widely by state. These variations
in energy resource quality simply represent the possibility for gains from trade.
Apart from the economic and environmental effects of an RPS, researchers could
also more closely examine the factors contributing to RPS adoption and the enactment of
certain quirks of RPS design. For example, state policies differ on the amount and type of
hydroelectric power that counts towards the RPS’s mandate. The restriction of certain
types of low-carbon energy sources, despite their ability to serve the environmental goals
of the RPS, present interesting political economy questions about the influence of interest
groups on RPS design.
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